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Title deeds land is

bounded only 14,torally,

a fundamental principle of the law that the estate

and dominion of the owner of the land so bounded extends
from the sky to the lower depths or from heaven to hell if
we interpret literally the maxim, "Cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos."

The following discussion

has to do with the law controlling property rights in elements beneath the surface, but as courts have never datended
t eir jurisdiction to the lowest depths the subject is naurally limited to the law as it applies to mankind in their
ddolings with subterranean property to a reasonable depth,
lealing those legally unexplored regions open to the farther
discussion of poets and theologians.

But even within this

limited jurisdiction the courts have found a great deal to
say upon the subject of subterranean rights, and a thorough
discussion of the mass of decisions involving rights in
mine-als, ores, and mining 6perations, in

petroleum oil,

in percolating waters, in natural gas, etc.,
in

is impossible

the limits of an ordinary thesis.
I have therefore bMn compelled to limit the discussion

to somenarroip-rphase

than rights in

subterranean property

generally and have chosen that phase which has to do with
free elements,

that is,

any one place,

those not fixed in

but mov*ig about under the surface in obedience to natural
laws.

This at once excludes the mass of law on mines and

mining operations, except in so far as such operations interfere wIth some other rights, as water rights.

The ores

beneath the surface in absence of ag-'eement to the contrary
are admitted generally to belong to the ovner of the surface.
Rights in subterranean elements are often modified by contract, and of course the rights qcqu!red in such a way depend
upon the nature of the contract in each particular case.
I have dealt only wi'th rights as they exist

naturally and

independent of any contractual rights except those conferring
title to the surface, and as cases pertaining to petroleuzn
oil have invariably arisen out of oil leases, natural rights
not being involved to any great extent,

they do not properly

come under discussion.
The majority of cases involving natural rights in free
elements have arisen in regard to rights
beneath the surfaceand the liability

in waters flowing

incurred b, owners of

3
the surface
ses.

interfering with their flow to adjoining premi-

Cases relating to gas and electricity are also found

in the later volumes of the reports.

The cases in regard

to subterranean waters will be first considered, they being
thus far of the most importance.

Rights in free elements beneath the surface, do not
depend to any great extent upon contract, but are natural
rights, gifts conferred by Nature fand consequently an interference with such rights would come under the law of torts.
It will therefore be wall in considering the cases upon
this subject to have in mind the general theory and application of the law of torts,
to guide us in

that we may have some principles

their examinationjand keep us from getting

lost in the tangle of judicial reasoning.

A fundamental

principle of the law of torts is, that a person is liable
only for the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
That is, if a person does some act which results in damage
to another,

which damage a person of ordinary prudence

would not reasonably expect to be the natural effect, of such
act then the person causing the damage is not responsible
and the injured party has no remedy.

If however common

experience has shown that certain acts produce specified results under circumstances which should be known to the person
coranitting these acts, then such person is said to have
acted with noticejand will be held responsible for any damage
resulting unless he can justify doing such damage.

A simple case illustrating
principles is

the application of these

as follows:

X has a spring on his land,

which is

supplied by a

subterranean stream running under Y's land.

Y having no

reason to believe that X's spring is supplied from his lan&i
digs a well which cuts off this supply and dries up X's
spring.

The damage sustained by X is damnum absque injuria.

But if Y knew of the existence of the subterranean stream
that fed X's spring and dug his well thus ruining the spring,
the injury caused, according to our principle, would be actionable if done without just cause.

If Y escapes liability

it is because, in the opinion of the Court he has acted with
just cause, or in other words he is privileged, knowingly to
inflict

the damage complained of.
The extent to which a person can claim such a privilege

is the difficult question in torts of this kind, and is largely one of public policy.

All laws should aim to accomplish

the greatest good to the greatest number, and in deciding a
question with regard to a privilege to knowingly inflict an
injury, we must compare the gain which would result from allowing the act with the loss which it occasions.
stated these principles are:

Briefly

If defendant could not have

foreseen the damage he has caused he is not liable.

If he

could have foreseen such damage, he is liable unless privileged to knowingly inflict such damage.

The question of

privilege is one of policy depending upon results.
Keeping these principles in mind, let us examine a few
of the leadin, cases and see where the courts in various
jurisdictions stand.

One of the earliest and perhaps the case

most frequently referred to is that of Acton v. Blundell,
12 M & W 324.

Here the plaintiff was the owner of a cotton-

mill and had sunk a well on his land for the use of such mill.
The defendants were mine owners and sunk shafts and dug pits
in operating their mine which was located about three-fourths
of a mile from plaintiff's well, whereby plaintiff's well
was made dry and thus destroyed.

Judge Tindal in consider-

ing these facts says the question to be decided is,
the right to the enjoyment of an underground spring,

"Whether
or of a

well supplied by such underground spring, is goverened by
the same rule of law as that which applies to, and regulates
a water course flowing on the surface."

After a brief dis-

cussion of the similarities and dissimilarities of surface
and subterranean streams and the principles applicable to

them the learned judge comes to the following conclusion:
"We think the present case for reasons above given, is not to
be governed by the law which applies to rivers and flowing
streams, but it rather falls within that principle, which gives
to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface;
that the land immediately below is his property whether it
is solid rock or porous ground or venous gar'h, or part soil
and part water;

that the person who owns the surface may

dig therein, and apply all that there is found to his own
purposes at his free will and pleasure;

and if in the exer-

cise of such right he intercepts or drains off the water
collected from underground springs in his neighbor's well,
this inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria which cannot become the ground
of an action. "

This extract is frequently referred to in

later cases and has undoubtedly exerted great influence in
shaping the course of the law on this point.

While not

wishing to question the correctness of the decision in Act6n
v. Blumdell, it seems to me that this statement of the owners
dominion over the percolating waters in his soil is unnecessary to the decision of the caseand is open to criticism as
not being an accurate conclusion to be drawn f*om the facts

and reasoning in the case.

Here the owners of the coal mine

could not be held to have foreseen that the natural and
probable consequence of their acts would be to dry up the
plaintiff's well and therefore should not have been held
liable.

The learned judge in his opinion recognizes this

principle in an indirect way and lays much stress on it.
The flow of surface streams he says is "public and notorious",
each man knows what he receives and what he transmits to
the lower owners.

"But in case of a well", he continues,

"sunk by a proprietor in his own land, the water which feeds
it from the neighboring soil does not flow openly in sight of
the neighboring proprietor, but through hidden veins of the
earth beneath its surface."

This alone according to our

first principle would be sufficient to defeat the action, but
the judge also makes use of the argument that it is policy
to grant the defendants the privilege of inflicting this injury.

He says:

"But if the man who sinks the well in his

own land can acquire by that act an absolute and indefeasible
right to the water that collects in it, he has the power of
preventing his neighbor from making any use of the spring
in his own soil which shall interfere with the enjoyment of

the well.

He has power still further of debarring the

owner of the land in

which the spring is

first

found or

through which it is transmitted, from draining his land for
the proper cultivation of the soil:
which is

voluntary on his part,

and thus by an act

and which may be entirely

unsuspected by his neighbor he may impose on such neighbor
the necessity of bearing a heavy expense)if the latter has
erected machinery for the purposes of mining, and discovers
when too late that the appropriation of the water has already been made.

Further the advantage on one side, and

the detriment to the pther may bear no proportion.

The

well may be sunk to supply a cottage, whilst the owner of
the adjoining land may be prevented from winning metals
and minerals of inestimable value.A

It is principally upon

these two arguments that the decision in this case rests,
and they fail to make it clear why water in a natural course
of transit under ground, should as such be more a subject of
individual property than water flowing above ground.

It

does not necessarily follow that a person has an absolute
property in percolating waters, because he is not liable
for interrupting their flow, therh he would be liable for
interrupting the flow of surface waters in which he has only

The fallacy of this reason-

a qualified right of property.

ing becomes more obvious by going back to the cause of the
non-liability for interfering with subterranean streams.
Stated from this stand point the argument would be as follows:
a riparian owner has only a qualified right in flowing surfacp water because he can see its flow, therefore since he
cannot percaivethefjow of subterranean Waters .he has an abIt seems to me that

solute right of property in them.

it would be just as reasonable to make the absolute property
in minerals depend upon the want of knowledge as to their
existence.

In a large number of cases however this state-

ment in Acton

v.

Blundell, that a different rule applys

with regard to surface and subterranean streams, and that
the owners of property in percolating waters is absolute is
accepted by learned judges without question.
In the leading case of Frazier

v. Brown 12 Ohio St.294

plaintiff alleged that his spring was injured by defendant
digging a hole in his land.

Defendant demurred to complaint

as not stating a cause of action and this demurrer was
sustained.

Here the Court said:

"

In absence of express

contract, as between proprietors of adjoining land the law
recognizes no correlative rights in respect to underground

waters percolating, oozing or filtrating through the earth;
and this mainly from considerations of public policy:

(1)

because the existence, origin, zd movement and course of
such waters, and the courses which govern their movements
are secret and concealedl

(2) because any such recognition

of correlative rights would interfere, to the detriment of
the conmonwealth, with drainage and agriculture, mining,the
construction of highways, etc."
Here again we see the general principles laid down in
the beginning recognized as the true basis of the decision.
In Roath

v.

Driscoll 20 Conn. 533 the plaintiff's

well was injured by excavations made by defendant on his
own land.

The Court refused to hold defendant liable, saying

"Water ccmbined with earth or passing through it by percolation, or by filtration or chemical attraction has no distinc4
tive character of ownership from the earth itself."

Acton v.

Blundell is cited with approval but here also the learned
judge makes use of the argtent that the damage could not be
foreseen.

"Besides" says he, "no man is bound to know

that his neighbor's well is supplied by water percolating
his own soil."

Again he says:

"Nor can any light be ob-

Their progress over the surface

tained from surface streams.
is seen and known and uniform.

They are not in the secret

places of the earth and a part of it."
In Delhi

v. Yeomans 50 Barb. 318 Judge Boardman states

the law as follows:

"The law controlling the rights to sub-

terranean waters is very different from that affecting the
rights to surface streams.

In the fonner case the water

belongs to the soil, is part of it, is owned and possessed
as the earth is, and may be used, removed and controlled to
the same extent by the owner."

In this case two springs

of plaintiffs were injured by acts of defendant in digging
a ditch on his own land, and a correct decision was reached
from the application of the foregoing principle.

This is

true however simply because this principle c,ould be deducted
from this case by the same line of reasoning by which it was
derived from the others.
In Chase

v.

Silverstone 62 Me. 175, defendant dug a

well on his own land thus drying up plaintiff's spring.

In

deciding this case the Court cite *ith approval the principles
derived from Acton v Blundell and cases following it.
in Chatfield

v.

So

Wilson 28 Vt. 49, the doctrine that a per-

son has an absolute right of property in percolating water

is recognized.
said:

In Goodale

v. Tuttle 29 N. Y.

Judge Denio

"We have lately decided that the principles which

apply to the abstructions of running streams do not govern
in

the case of waters running under the soil."
Other cases might be cited to the same effect but theve

will be sufficient to show the position taken by many Courts.
Although a correct decision is reached in a majority of cases
I do not think the doctrine of abso-lute'
waters beneath the surface is

oimership of the

well founded in

legal principles

and surely there is nothing in its practical operation that
so commends it to our approval as to lead to its adoption.
Such a doctrine is illogical and inconsistent.

For if the

owner of the soil has an absolute property in the water,
the same as in the other elements his neighbor has no more
right to take away his water than he has to take away his
sand or ores.

But the decisions already referred to dlear-

ly recognize the right of a person to make excavations in
own land even if
soil.

his

It does drain the water from his neighbors

Thus a logical application of the doctrine would

bring about one of the very evils which by its
sought to be avoided.

adoption is

In most of the cases one of the

reasons given to sustain this doctrine is that, if a person
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were held liable for interrupting a flow of subterranean
waters, he would lose all dominion over his land and could
not use it for ordinary purposes of cultivation or building
or mining, but the learned judges overlooked the fact that
these same operations were just as apt to cause a neighbor's
water, his property,

to be taken away as it

was to prevent
They

other water from flowing to the neighbo-'s premises.
have jumped out of the f-ying pan only to land in
if

they carry their doctrine to its

logical conclusion.

An excellent case taking this view Is, Bassett
Co., 43 N. H., 569.

the fire,

v.

Mining

However, I do not wish to be understood

as saying that the law governing subterranean streams is
the same as that governing surface streams.
is this:

What I do say

that the same principles are applicable to both

subterranean and su-face streams, but that the application
of these principles to subterranean waters may lead to different results, than when applied to surface waters, in fact
we often have different rules arising from the application
of these principles to differen

t

surface streams.

The

general rule with regard to surface streams is that each
riJparian owner has a right to use the water flowing through
his land as he may see fit, but he must. allow it to pass on
to his neighbor not materially altered in quality or quantity.

~15
This is said to be the general rule because the principles
of torts before mentioned when applied to a majority of the
The same principles applied

cases produce such a result.

in a majority of cases relating to subterranean waters would
produce a different result, so that by applying the doctrine
that a different rule of law governs in subterranean and
surface waters a correct decision, as before stated would be
reached in most cases.
That the same principles apply to both surface and subterranean waters and that the difference in results is due
to the fact that in one instance the damage can be foreseen
and in the other not, is also clearly shown in many cases
by dicta from the judges to the effect that, when the subterranean waters flow in known

and defined channels the

same law governs as is applicable to surface streams.As is.said
'4

by Lewis C. J. in Wheatley

v. Bough, in limestone regions

streams of great volume and power pursue their subterranean
cources fo" great distances and then emerge from their caverns
furnishing power for machinery of every description, or supplying towns and settlements with water for all the purposes
of life;

and he expresses the opinion, that "to say that

these streams might be obstructed or diverted merely because
they run through subterranean channels, is to forget the

I0
rights and duties of man in relation to flowing water."
In Dickinson

Grand Junction Canal Co., Parke B says

v.

on this point, "if the course of a subterranean stream
were well known---as in the case with many, which sink underground pursue for a short space a subterranean course, and
then emerge again---it never could be contended that the
owner of the soil, unde', which the stream flowed, could not
maintain an action for the diversion of it,

if

it

took place

under such circumstances as would have enabled him to recover
if

the stream had been wholly above ground."

the case of Delhi
Boardman says:

v.

So also in

Youmans before referred to, Judge

"Subterranean streams that have a known and

well defined channel, constituting a regular and constant
flow of water, are subject to the same law with surface

t:::

streams and subject only to like interruptions and interference."
Thus far we have considered the application of the principle that a person is liable only for such damage as ought
reasonably to be foreseen as a result of his acts.

This

from the very nature of the rights with which we have been
dealing covers a majority of the decisions on the subject.
Some of the cases raised the question as to whether rights
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in percolating waters might be gained by prescription, but
so
it has been uniformly held that no rights could bb 'acquired.
This is undoubtedly correct, as prescription is based on a
supposed grant made at some remote period, and in these
cases it would be absurd to presume a grant of rights of
whose existence the supposed grantor had no knowledge.

A

great many of the cases also contain dicta to the eflect
that defendant would have been liable if he had acted with
malice.

This however comes more properly under a discussion

of those cases where the resulting injury could be foreseen,
which will next be considered.

From the foregoing discussion we find that a person is
not liable for interfering with the flow of subterranean
waters in a majority of cases.

The true basis of this non-

liability is that the damage is unexpected, and not that the
owner of the soil has an absolute rigt.t of property in percolating waters.

If we recognized this latter basis as the

true one, there would be no use of taking up cas 3s, where a
person can see that he will injure his neighbor by using his
own water, for it is a general rule of property that a man
can use his own as he may see fit although his neighbor may
suffer inconvenience because such property is not given to
him.

But let us assume that in a given case such water is

not the absolute property of the defendant,

the owner of the

soil, and also let us assume, that the natural and probable
result to be expected from defendant's acts is a damage to
plaintiff, then according to the second principle of torts
laid down at the commncement of this article,

defendant

should be held liable unless he can show that the law gives
him a privilege knowingly to inflict such damage.

The right

to sucha privilege as before stated is one of policy depending upon the results to be attained;

that is, the Court's

aim to adopt some principle controlling the question of
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privilege which they think most conducive to the general
public welfare.

An instance is seen in the doctrine of

flowing surface streams.

Here a riparian owner can foresee

the damage that a stoppage or corruption of the flow will
cause, but still the Courts say he is not liable for any
damage caused by a reasonable use of the water,
by such use his neighbors use is destroyed.
reasonable use is

even though

What is a

a question of fact depending largely upon

the circu'stances of each particular case.

Thus it has been

held, that it is a reasonable use if a party taked all the
water flowing in a stream if he requires it for ordinary
domestic purposes,

this being called an ordinary use.

In

larger streams, a reparian owner has also the right to use
the water for other than domestic purposes, but this extraordinary use is inferior to the ordinary use of other riparian owners, and the extraordinary use of one proprietor
is no greater than that of others simply from his advantage
in

position on the stream.

In

sane states with dry climates

it has also been held, a reasonable use to take all of a
surface stream for purposes of irr4gation.

The doctrine of

reasonable use I think can also be applied to cases involving
damages caused by the interruption or pollution of subterranean waters where such damage can be foreseen.
A leading case on this phase is Chas qorev . v. Richards,

7 H.L.C. 379.

Plaintiffs were the owners of an ancient mill

situated on the banks of the Wandle river and for a period of
upwards of half a century the owners of this mill had been
entitled to use and enjoy the flow of said river for the
purpose of working and using this mill.

The river Wandle

had its source near the town of Craydon and was fed and
supplied by rain falling on the surrounding territory and
finding its way by percolation through the soil to the river.
Defendants sunk a well on their own land near the town of
Craydon and about one fourth of a mile from the riverfor
the purpose of supplying the town of Craydon with water.
It was found as a fact in the case, that the natural effect
to be reasonably expected from sinking the well and continually pumping large quantities of water for a long time,
would be to sensibly diminish the water supply in the river
Wandle.

Nevertheless after sinking the well, defendants

pumped dailytherefrom about 500,000 gallons of water, whereby the flow in the river was perceptibly diminished and the
plaintiffs greatly damaged, for which they brought action.
Applying the doctrine of reasonable use and we have practically the same problem to solve as though defendants had taken
precisely the same amourtof water from the river.

The re-

sults would be just the same in both cases and we have
assumed that such results ought reasonably to have been foreseen.

It is plain that such is not a reasonable use, and

the learned judges intimate that if the water had been
taken from the river directly, defendants must have been
held liable.

However I fail to see why they should be al-

lowed to do indirectly what could not have been done directly
when the damages to be expected are obviously the same in
either case.
this case,

Yet this was allowed by the learned judges in

when they held that defendants were not liable.

It seems to me that it is just here,, that the application
of the doctrine laid down in Acton

v.

Blundell works harm.
v.

The judges in this case quote from Acton

Blundell with

approval overlooking the fact that the decisive point in that
case is entirely wanting here.

The cases of Rawston

'Taylor, 11 Exch. 3M. and Broadbent

v.

v.

Ramsbotham 11 Exch.

602 are also both relied upon to sustain the decision in
this case.

In these cases defendants drained marshy places

on their land in order to make it tillable.
of this drainage,

In consequence

the flow of natural streams of water was

diminished and plaintiffs injured thereby.

Defendants were

not held liable in either case and the judges cite them as

sustaining the proposition that waters on the land, not part
of a flowing stream are the absolute property of the owner
of the land and, that consequently he is not liable for preventing their flow to a natural stream.

These cases there-

fore appear to have a direct bearing on the point.

We

cannot however predicate so much on them as this, for they
go no farther than to actually decide that defendants were
mneliable for a reasonable use of their land and that
draining it to render it tillable is a reasonable use.
Therefore, they cannot be cited as giving defendant an absolute right to intercept water that would reach a natural
stream,

but are of importance only as they bear upon what

is a reasonable use.
Some of the learned judges seem to think also that a
decision for the plaintiff involved the establishing of the
doctrine, that a person would be liable in any case if he
interfered with water that naturally would find its way to a
water course.

Such a doctrine, they argued, would prevent

the clearing of land, as forests preserve the streams;
would prevent draining land or it might prevent in man- cases
building on the land, structures whose roofs would prevent
the rain from falling in
the same stream.

itsnatural

manner and percolating

Such arguments can have but little

force

if looked at properly as it is obvious that a decision for
plaintiff would not mean that in no case could percolating
waters be interfered with and further, it is clear that
every instance referred to was of the plainest sort of reasonable use.

It was also argued that as each land owner

had a right to a well for his ovm use, plaintiffs could be
injured to the same extent and no one be liable, since it
could not perhaps be said that the first well had done any
appreciable injury and the owner of the last well should not
be liable for the damage done by all, simply because his
happened to make the loss appreciable.

Why then ought

defendants to be liable for digging one well to supply
a thousand people and no one be liable for the digging of a
thousand wells.

The fallacy of this argument lies in

assuzning that the water from the one well went only to supply
land owners who might have dug wells.

If it went only to

such as had rights to dig wells, it would have undoubtedly
been a reasonable use and defendants not liable.

Lord

WenzlQrdale although concurring with the other judges does so
with reluctance and his opinion is much in the nature of a
dissentigZ opinion.

It seems to me that the following quo-

tation from his &pinion expresses the true conclusion to be
drawn from the facts:

"The question in this case, therfore,

as it seems to me resolves itself into an injury, whether
the defendant exercised his right of employing the subterraneous waters in a reasonable manner.

Had he made the

well and used the steam engines for the supply of water for
the use of his own property, and those living on it,
could have been no question.

there

If the number of houses upon

it had increased to any extent and the quantity of water
for the families dwelling on the property had been 0roportionately augmented, there could have been no just grounds of
complaint.

But I doubt very greatly the legality of the

defendant's acts in abstracting water for the use of a large
district in the neighborhood, unconnected with his own estate, for the use of those who would have no right to take
p

it directly themselves, and to the injury of those neighboring proprietors who have an equal right with themselves.
It does not follow that each person who was supplied with
water by the defendant could have dug a well for himself on
his own land, and taken the like quantity of water,

so that

the defendant may have taken much more than would have been
abstracted if each had exercised his own right.

The same

objection would not apply to the abstraction of water for
the use of the dwellers on defendant's land,

even though they

carried on trades requiring more water than would be used

for mere domestic purposes;
purposes only.

it would still be for their

But in this case there has been An abstrac-

tion of water for purposes whojly unconnected with the enjoyment of the defendanit's land."
Another case very much like that of Chasemore
Richards is that of Dickinson v. The Canal Co.,

v.

7 Exch. 282.

Defendant Company in constructing their canal cut off water
that would have found its way to flowing streams.

Plaintiffs

were mill owners on one of such streams and were allowed to
recover damages for their injury by the Court of Exchecquer
Pollock C. B. writing the opinion.

This was an earlier case

though than Chasemore v. Richards and seems to be questioned
by it, Justice Wightman in his opinion seaning to think the
Dickinson case inconsistent with the principles established
by Acton v.

Blundell.

Another case illustrating this phase of the question is
that of Burroughs

v.

Sattcrlee 67 Iowa 396.

The plaintiff

here was the owner of certain land which he leased to the
defendant for mining purposes.

While borin, for coal a

vein of'water possessing magnetic 14perties and of great
value for medicinal purposes was struck.
all

his interest

Defendant:;oonvcyed

in the well and land to plaintiff

who erect-

ed

lexpensive buildings and advertised the healing qualities

of the water.

Many persons were thereby attracted to this

watering place for treatment and pleasure and the premises
became a

Later defen-

source of much profit -to plaintiff.

dant purchased land adjoining plaintiff's and drilled another
well about 200 feet distant with the expectation of striking the same vein.of water.

He did strike the same vein

and as his land was lower than that of plaintiff,
in

plaintiff's

well ceased to flow as

from defendant's well.

the water

formerly,

all

flowing

For a time after drilling this well

defendant placed a piece of pipe on the top of his well and
raised the discharge pipe to the same height as the discharge
pipe

in plaintiff's well, when the water flowed from both

thus furnishing an ample supply for both parties.

Later

defendant removed this pipe and plaintiff asked for an injunction compelling him to replace

it.

The

trial Court

granted the injunction, and the higher Court sustained them,
the judge saying in the opinion:

"We think the Court very

properly held that these parties should each use

the water

from his ovn well so as not to injury the other, upon the
same principle that the owner of land over which a stream
of water has its course may have a reasonable and proper use
of the water as it flows, but may not wholly divert it

from

the adjoining propriet.or."
Hale
case.

v. McLea, 53 Cal. 578 Is another illustrative

Here plaintiff and defendant were owners of adjoin-

ing ranches.

On plair~iff's land and near the line between

the two ranches was a spring which supplied water for plaintiff's cattle.

From this spring a line of bushes extended

across the division line and upon defendant's land.

Such

bushes in that region were usually found only over water
courmes, but there was no surface stream there and the bushes
formed the only indication of a subterranean flow.

Defendant

dug a trendh on his land at right angles with the line of
bushes,

and thus cut off the s,,pply to plaintiff's spring.

The trench was dug for the purpose of cutting off this subterranean stream, the defendant using part of the water for
watering his stock.

Plaintiff prayed for an injunction

and his prayer was granted, on the ground, that had the
stream been a surface stream defendant would not under the
circumstances have been entitled to divert more than was necessary for his use and the facts sho 'red that he allowed same,.
to go to waste.

Other cases might be cited along this same

line, but these will be sufficient to show that the doctrine
of reasonable use

applies or should apply the same to the

diversion of known subterranean waters as to the diversion of
surface waters.

The application of' this same principle

would also prevent the dive-r'sion of water from a natural
City

stream, after it had become a pa-t of such stream.

Authooities would therefore have no more right to take
water from a flowing stream by drilling a well on the banks
of the stream and piznping large quantities of water therefrom, than they would to take the water directly from the
stream itself, without first allowing it to percolate into
the well.

ActAna

Two very good cases on this point are:

Mills v. Brookline 127 Mass. 69, Emporia v. Soden 25 Kansas
588.
With regard to the pollution of subte-ranean waters, as
strict a "ule applies as is applicable in the case of surface
streams, and this seems to be so even in jurisdictions where
in all other instances it is held that surface and subterraThe re-

nean waters are governed by different principles.
mark of the learned judge,. in the old case of Tenant
Goldwin 2 Ld Raymond 1089,

that "he whose dirt

it

is

v.
must

keep It that it may not trespass", seems to have exercised
a Very potent influence in decisions of this class of cases.
That was a case where filth fom defendant's privy oozed
through into plaintiff's

cellar

adjoining and defendant

is

held for danages.

A strict. application of the foregoing

principleowould render a person liable
polluting the waters of another.

in

all

cases

for

But in a -ecent case

Michigan, Judge Cooley very pointedl" observes:

in

"If withdraw-

ing the water from one's well by an excavation on adjoining lands will give no right of action, it

is difficult to

understand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of the
adjoining premises can be actionable when there is no actual
intent to injure and no negligence.

The one act destroys

the well, and the other does no more."

This perhaps is

stating

for polluting

the doctrine as to non-liability

waters too strongly.

the

A person would not be j ustified in

polluting a well and thins spoiling it simplv because he
might dig one for the use of his own premises which would
cause the other to dry up.

Digging the well might be a

reasonable use of his premises,

whereas

the depositing

of

filth which would filter into the ground and pollute subterranean waters would not.

In fact, pollution of waters

usually results from a non-natural use of the land and in
most cases could be avoided by ordinary care, and hence
majority of cases the plaintiff
dant cannot establish that
to inflict such an injury.

recover's

because

in

the defen-

the law grants him the pivilege
The true doctrine here As

in

a

surface streams ij does the pollution result from a reasonable use by defendant of his premises!
A good case Illustrazing what
lands :hat ma'"callse floing
Pennsylvanla Coal Co.

v.

is a reasonable use of

water to be polluted Is that of
Sanderson 113 Pa. St. 126.

This case was before the Supreme Con-t of Pennsylvania four
times, the last decision overruling the first and holding
that the trial court erred in charging as directed by the
Supreme Court in

their first

decision.

Defendants were

mine o,,vners and in working their mines pumped mine water
upon the land, from whence it naturally found its way into a
small mo'lntain brook, of pure running water.

was

Plaintiff

the ovmer of land through which this brook ran and used the
water from it for domestic and ornamental purposes and had a
large trout pond supplied by it, having made his improvements before defendantsopenedtheir mine.

The water from

the mine fouled this brook so as to render the water unfit
for use,

killing the fish in

in plaintiffs' house, etc.

the pond, spoiling the pipes
It

was held that plaintiff

could

not recover, as the injury resulted from a reasonable use
by defendants of their land and the injury could not have
been avoided by exercising reasonable care.
this case, the Court say, that if

In deciding

defendants were liable to
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plaintiff

-.iparian ovmers and

they would be liable to all

would
be equivalent to
cases
many
in
all
to
liable
to hold them
ordering the mines closed as the profits from the coal would
not pay the damages to rparian

oners.

They were therefore

called upon to decide which of two conflicting interests
they would recognize,

the coal mining industry or the rights

of riparian owners to have flowing waters left unpolluted
for domestic uses~ fish ponds, etc.

The judges thought

that coal mining was the most important as bringing the
greatest benefits to a majotity of the eitizens of the State,
as there were other sources for water than streams and if
not it was more practicabl- for riparian owners to filter
what little water they needed for domestic purposes than for
coal companies to filter the immense quantities taken from
their mines* th-is I think was a correct conclusion and illustrates also how the Courts will weigh results in deciding
the question of privelege.
A very important case showing under what circumstances
a person will be held responsible for damages caused by
polluting subterranean waters in Collins
Co. 131 Pa. St. 143.
and lot in

v. Charties Gas

Plaintiff was the owner of a house

the Town of Glenfie]d.

Upon his lot was a well

to suwply water for domestic purposes.

Defendant Company

drilled gas wells in that vicinity for the purpose of obtaining natural gas.
salt water rose in

In drilling these wells, a vein of
in the

the wells and mingled vithh2,water

stratum that supplied plaintiff's welljthus rendering it
unfit for use.

The facts show that such a result was na-

turally to be expected fom drilling the gas wells without
shutting off the salt water from the fresh water, which
might have been done had reasonable care and judgment been
exercised.

In

this case the learned judge it

seems to me

gives us the esseipe of the law controlling subterranean
waters in the following quotation from his opinion:

"It is

therefore clear, from the principles and reasonings of all
the cases that the distinction between rights An surface
and in subterranean waters is not founded on the fact of
their location above or below ground, but on the fact of
knowledge actual or reasonably acquirable of their existence,
location and couqse.
v.

The principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co.

Sanderson is precisely the same as that of Wheatley

v.

Baugh (a case almost identical with Acton v. Blundell) and
is

of general application.

flicts

It is that the use which in-

the damage must be natural,

proper,

negligence and the damage unavoidable.

and free from ,

-

On the question of

negligence the question of knowledge is always important and

may be conclusive.

Hence the practical injury is, first,

whether the damage was necessary and unavoidable;

secondly,

if not was it sufficiently obvious to have been foreseen
and also preventable by reasonable ca"e and expenditure?
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson the damage was unavoidable.

In Wheatley

before hand;
either case."

v. Baugh it was not

hence the plaintiff

Iscertainable

had no cause of action in

He then goes on to state that if the bounda-

ries of knowledge have so extended that the reason of the
law has ceased to be, why the law also founded on such reason ought to fall.
in

Hence in the case at bar as progress

geology had given knowledge of the existence of the various

strata of water, and as the means of preventing the mixing
were available at a reasonable expense,
would be a violation of the living spirit

he decided that it
of the law not to

recognize the change, and apply the settled and immutable
principles

to the altered conditions of fact.

Many of the cases on subterranean waters contain statements, mostly data, to the effect that defendant would have
been liable had he acted with malice.

Malice as here used

may be defined as the doing of an tnjury intentionally without cause or excuse,

the willful infliction of an i4ly.

It is very closely allied to gross negligence.

Thus if a

person does some act likely to result in

injury to another

which might have been avoided by a proper amunt of caution
we say he is guilty of negligence.
jury is

If

the liability

of in-

obvious we say the act.t was.negligenc- f the injury

is almost inevitable and actually follows the doing of the
act then we say the act was malicious.

The close relation

between gross negligence and malice is also shown from the
fact that pui1-iVe

damages are allowed by many courts in

cases where the injury inflicted has been malierious or was
the result of gross negligence on the part of the defendant.
cases where the defendant acted

Looked at in

this light,

with malice,

would naturally come under that principle where

the damage could be foreseen.

For when we say that the

defendant has acted with malice we assume that he intended
to inflict the injury, and intending to inflict the injury
ke must naturally infer that he would adopt means that he
foresaw or thought would accomplish his end,

that is,

he must

be held to have acted with knowledge as to what the consequences of his acts were apt to be.

Having proceeded thus far

we must accordingly hold defendant liable in

such a case

unless he can justify his act as a reasonable use of his
land.

Here again however our definition helps us out as

35
it

says malice is

without cause or excuse.
in

infliction of an injury

the intentional

Hence it would appear clear that

applying our principles we must hold defendant liable

in all cases where he has maliciously interfered with subterranean waters.
The only cases directly bearing on this point however
take an opposite view and hold that defendant is

not liable

for maliciously interfering with the flow of subterranean
waters.

Such decisions are the logical outcome of the

doctrine that water flowing beneath the soil is as much
the property of the owner of the soil as rocks or minerals
there found.

If the water belonged absolutely to the owner

of the soil the same as the soil itself it would be difficult
to see where any liabilitypould attach for his doing an act
which only prevented his own property from escaping from his
premises.

It would be just as reasonable to say that be-

cause he did not care to make use of the minerals on his land
that he could not therefore prevent his neighbors from taking
them, as to say that because he did not wish to use the water,
which was his the same as the minerals, he could not therefore prevent others from taking it.
on this point are Chatfield

v.

The two leading cases

Wilson 28 Vt. 49 and
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Phelps

v. Nowlen 72 N. Y.,

39.

In the former defendant

dug a treleh in his own land and filled it with dry hard
earth to prevent water from filtering through into plaintiff's
to supply his spring.

The judge said:

"Putting this case,

then upon the ground that the water in question, while in
the earth of defendant is not distinct from it in the eye
of the law it

becomes an important inquiry whether the act of

*he defendant in

the obstruction of the underground water

upon his own premises, can be made actionable simply on the
ground that the motive was bad that induced it.

The act,

being in itself lawful, could not subject the defendant to
damagesdunless by reason thereof,- some right of the plaintiff
had been violated."

So in the New York case the judge

quotes with approval the following from Washburn:

"But 1f

one has a legal right "to do certain acts in regard to his
own property it is difficult to imagine how he should forfeit
them from unfriendly motives toward the party who is affected
by them."

There have been no cases as I have found which

squarely decided that defendant would be liable for malicious
interference

with the flow of sub-surface waters*

The

Vermont case however recognized that malicious motives would
make a difference if the same rule applied as apblied to sur-
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face streams, and I think there is no doubt but what all
ccurts now that recognize the doctrine of correlative rights
in subterranean waters would hold defendant liable for maSuch being the case we will not go

licious interference.

into the mnerits of the discussion as to whether an act lawful in

itself

can make the doer liable if

done fuom ma-

licious motives.
This is the condition then in which we find the law of
subterranean waters.

The courts in the beginning fell un-

coneaiously into an error from which they have not entirely
freed themselves as yet.

The tendency however

decisions are in the right direction.

of the later

There are many im-

portant cases which although I have examined them, have not
been referrcd to in the body of this article but a list of
such cases will be found at the end.
drawn from these cases seem to
I.

The conclusions to be

me to be as follows:

The absolute dominion of the ovmer of the soil can-

not be so limited as to render him liable for the interference
substances
with rights which his neighbor has in passing under the surface of his land,

the existence of which rights was first

made known by the very act which would constitute the subject matter of complaint.

This applies to diverting and
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corrupting waters.

The case of Acton

v.

Blundell would

illustrate when a person was not liable for diverting waters.
In

the case of Collins

v.

Gas Co.

we would have an illus-

tration of the non-liability of defendants for corrupting
plaintiff's well, if

they had not known

of the existence

of the two veins of water and the drilling of their well
had first made known the fact that the salt water was apt to
rise and mix with the fresh water.
II.

The absolute dominion of the owner of the soil will

not however give him the right to interfere with waters running under his land to that of his neighbor if he ought
reasonably to infer the existence of such subterranean waters,
and might by a reasonable use of his land avoid injury.
Diverting more than is necessary for the use of his premises
is not a reasonable use, the same as in surface streams.
Damage caused by negligence is not reasonable, nor is a malicious injury reasonable.

Necessary and unavoidable injury

may be justified as a reasonable use.

If damages which in

the first instance could not have been foreseen can by the
use of reasonable care, expense, and consistently with a
reasonable use of the premises,
permanent,

be prevented from becoming

this principle also applies anda parttr would be

held for all unnecessary damages which might have been prevented.
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Gas is another valuable substance found in many places,
permeating the porous rocks deep in the bowels of the earth
and rushing to the surface through any opening into the
basin in which it is held.
owners in relation to it?
Hague

v.

Whatareitherights of adjoining
The leading case on this is

Wheeler 27 At. 714.

Plaintiffs and defendants

were owners of gas wells on adjoining lands.
well was drilled at

Defendant's

the instigation of one of the plaintiffs

and so no malice could be imputed in drilling it.

Plaintiffs

were selling their gas but defendants were allowing the gas
from their well to escape into the air and waste.

Plain-

tiffs asked an injunction restraining defendants from allowing their gas to waste as it would sooner exhaust the supply
for plaintiffs' wells.

They conceded that if defendants

were selling their gas they would have no right to the injunction but contend that defendants have no right to waste
it for the sole purposeof injuring them.

The lower court

granted the injunction on the ground that the parties had
correlative rights in t1e gas the same as in water and that a
malicious use was not a reasonable use.
that any use but one pUiely MaAlitoUs
It says:

The Court concede
would be justifiable.

"I concede that the defendants may lawfully take

as much gas s

they can get by wells drilled upon their land,
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and apply it to any useful purpose though with an avowed
intention of destroying the plaintiffs' wells in so doing,
and a malicious pleasure in the act."

The Supreme Court

reversed this decision on the ground that as the defaidants
had no malicious motive in drilling their well, they obtained
an absolute right of property in the gas that cane from it
the same as in coal taken from a mine and could do with it as
they saw fit.

That because they could not make use of their

gas they were no more legally bound to give it to their
neighbors than they were to give them other property for
which they had no use and which might benefit such neighbors.
The decision then seems to all depend upon the fact whether
we are to treat surface owners as having a qualified property
in gas as in flowing waters or as having an absolute property
therein the same as in ores and minerals.

The application

of our second principle in torts do not help us much as -re
have the courts divided as to whether the defendant is privileged to inflict injury under such circumnstances.

The

lower Court says, that taking the gas though done maliciously
is

a sufficient justification to grant tlie privilege if the

gas is applied to some useful purpose, but not otherwise,
the higher Court, that the right to take the gas at all is
sufficient justification for the injury no matter what the

motive for taking it

or the use to which it

is

rut.

question as to the nature

Coming back to the

of the

property adjoining owners have

in

it

a

iight of property like

in

flowing waters or is

qualified and correlative

erty in minerals?

it

more in

the nature

gas.

Is
that

of ones prop-

That gas differs from flowing water to a

great extent is obvious.
that

the underlying

One of the grounds for holding

adjoining owners have ordy a

qualified right

in

flowing

waters is that nature keeps the supply constant and this
not for the benefit of one particular owner but for all.
A use of all the water in a stream to-day will not interfere
with its

flow to-morrow in

the

same place.

Water that

flows by in the future may be the same that has already
flowed in the same course in the past.

Not so with gas,

when once used it is gone forever, like minerals taken from
the earth, it never naturally finds 6ts way back.

If a

land owrer does not take his share of the gas while it
going he wont

get any;

is

nature has no process by which the

supply is kept continuous as is the water supply.

Again

the reasonable use of water by adjoining owners gives each
only what is

necessary for his own premises,

selling the water

deprive the other.

Court admitted that no liability

neither

can

by

With the gas the

would be created if

defend-

ants were selling their gas no matter how much injury the
It

plaintiffs sustained.

may be true that

no land ovmer

gets through his well gas exclusively from his own land,
but this alone is not

sufficient

to make out that his right

in such escaping gas is only a qualified right.

Gas has

been teimeid a mineral ferae naturae and it seems to me that
drilling the well that hits the pocket containing the gas,
may be likened to firing the shot that kills the deer, the
man who strikes the gas being entitled absolutely to all
that he gets as the result
man who

fires

entitled to

of his strike

the shot which kills
it and to

the

same as the

the deer is

absolutely

do as he pleases with the carcass.

Of course the exclusive

right to drill belongs in the first

place to the land owners, but they may grant such right to
whoever they see fit.
practically

that all

Taking this view and the result is
land owners overlying a pocket

have rights of property in
possibility

of getting

ga pon in

at the share

it
that

of gas

and owing to the
canes

im-

from the land

of each the best division possible to give each person the
absolute

right

to all

that

comes

through all the wells he

may drill on his territory the same as he has an absolute
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right to all

the game he kills

on his own land.

I wont go

into the question as to whether a person who has an absolute
right to do a certain thing is
act solely from malice.

liable for damages if

he

A majority of the cases hold not,

but still there is much reason the other way.

In Pennsyl-

vania they hold that no liability attaches for simple malice
so the Supreme Court were undoubtedly right in their decision. for that state.
A question similar to that involved in caso-sof percolating waters arises with regard to damages caused by the
discharge of electricity into the earth.

There are not many

cases on this point yet reported, but it must be remembered
that the remarkable developments in electrical science have
been nade but recently,

and the damaging effects of electri-

city along certain lines is just beginning to be felt.

E-

lectricity from electric railways has thus far caused the
greater part of damage.

Scattering through the earth it

is conducted by means of the ground connections to the telephone wires and being stronger than the telephone current
overcomes it and in many cases has rendered telephone lines
practically useless.

Besides this the electricity has also

acted Uponoas and water pipes and by a system of electrolysis

has practically destroyed the gas and water mains along the
lines of these roads in manv large cities.

The only cases

at present reported are in relation to injuries caused to
telephone lines by electricity escaping from street railways.
They are two in number, me arising in this country and one
in England, and although nearly identical in fact
cisions,xre in direct conflict.
the doctrine of Rylands
that,

v.

the de-

The English Court applies

Fletcher 3 H. L. 330, which is

"if the owner of land brings upon his land anything

not naturally upon it, and which is in itself dangerous,
and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control,
though in so doing he may act without personal wilfulness
or negligence, he will be liable in damages for any mischief
thereby occasioned."

In these cases though the land into

which both plaintiff andde-fendanits discharged their electric
current did not belong to them they stood in practically
the same relationto each other as that sustained by adjoining owners, as each',tad the legal right to the use of
the land for his particular purpose.
of Rylands

v.

Hence the doctrine

Fletcher-could apply here the same as in a

case between neighboring owners, and applying this doctrine

defeniants would be held liable.
Nat. Telephone Co.

v.

Baker, L.R. 2Ch. Div.1893.

The American case however does not apply the rule of
Rylands

v.

accepted.

Fletcher, which in fact it says is not generally
This is the case of Cumberland Tel. Co. v. United

Electric Ry. Co. 42 Fed. 273 and the facts are as already
stated.

In his opinion the judge says:

"In solving these

questions, we are compelled to bear in mind the fact that
the science of electricity is still in its experimental stage;
that a device which to-day may be the best, cheapest, and
most practicable, may in another year, be superseded in comparably better fitted for the purpose.

It is quite possi-

ble too that the legal obligations of the parties may change
With the progress of invention, and the duty of sunnounting
the difficulty be thrown upon our party or the other as a
cheaper or more effectual remedy is discovered."

The learn-

ed judge then discusses the principles involved and comes,
to the following conclusion:

"That where a person is making

a lawful use of his own property, or of a public franchise, in
such a manner as to occasion injury to another, the question
of his liability will depend upon the fact whether he has

made use of the means which in the progress of science and
improvement has been found best.

If

in

the case LLnder con-

sideration, it were shown that the double trolley would
obviate the injury to the plaintiff without exposing defendant
or the public to any great inconvenience or a

large ex-

penze we think it would be their duty to make use of it.
and should have no doubt of our power to aid the complainant
byan-injunction;

,but

as the proofs '

show that a more

effectual and 1ewe objectionable and expensive remedy is
open to the complainant, we think the obligation is upon
the telephone company to adopt it, and that the damages incidentally -done to complainant arenot chargeable to defendants.

Unless we are to hold that the telephone company

has a monopoly of the use of the earth, for its feeble current, not only as against defendants but as against all forms
of electrical energy which, in a progress of science may,
hereafter require its use we do not see how this atiom.can' be
maintained."
This I tiAnk is :,Mre logical and just than the English
rule and telephone companies to prevent interference with
their lines by electric roads have adopted the metallic cur-

47
tFrom what has been quoted from the opinion we

rent.:>

can also see that the learned judge has applied the pinciples
of torts referred to at the beginning.

Defendants liability

when it attaches is made to defend upon the fact that he
could foresee the injury to Plaintiff and could by the use
of reasonable care and expense have avoided.

The same rtle

I think also applies to damages done by electricity to gas
and water pipes.
ways A

In

the fir'st instance the electric

rail-

not being able to foresee such damage, perhaps should

not be held liable.

If however after acquiring knowledge

of the effects of electricity escaBping to the earth they do
not take all precautionary measures possible to prevent
injury they should thereafter be held for any damages.
Progress 4n science and invention therefore must play a
great part in determining just what liability will attach
in any particular case as it may arise.
What the future may bring forth in litigation over subterranean rights is

difficult to predict,

and is

perhaps of

no great consequence at present.

But with electric rail-

w7ays rapidly increasing in

with the growth of

number,

u

c

in large cities in favor of.compelling telephone, telegraph,
and electric light companies to bury their wires, and with
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subterranean rapid transit almost assured, it is not improbable that subterranean rights may be a very fruitful
source of litigation.

X.A.1/

TABLE OF CASES AND REFERENCES.

Aeton

v.

Blundell, 12 M. & W. 336

Actina Mills

Brown

v.

Brookline, 127 Mass. 69

Salisbury Mining Co., 43 N. 11.

v.

Bassett

v.

Illius, 25 Conn. 583

Broadbent

v.

Ramsbotham, 11 Exch. 602

Greely, 45 N. Y., 671

Bliss v.
Burroughs

v.

Satterlee,

Chasemore

v.

Richards, 7 H. L. Cases 349

Charfield

v.

Wilson, 28 Vt. 49

Chase

Silverstone, 62 Me. 175

v.

Collins

67 Iowa, 396

Gas Co., 131 Pa. St., 143

v

Dickinson

v.

Ellis

Duncan, 21 Barb. 230

v.

Grand Junct. Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282

Emporia

v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588

Frazier

v.

Brown,

Goodale

v.

Tuttle,

Greenleaf

v.

Green Castle

12 0. St.
29 N. Y.,

304
466

Francis, 18 Pick. 117
v. Hazlett, 23 Ind. 186

Hague

v.

Wheeler, 157vPenn. St. 324

Hague

v.

Wheeler, 27 At. 714

Haldeman

579

v.

Bruckhardt, 45 Penn. St. 521

Hale

McLea, 53 Cal. 578

v.

v. Leach, 53 Cal. 262

Huston

v. Ennor, 4 B & S 229

Hodgkinson
Kiff

Youmans, 86 N. Y., 324

v.

Mosier
Mahan

v.

Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363
Brown, 13 Wend. 261

v.

Ottawa Gas Co. v. Graham, 35 Ill., 346
Pixley

v.

Clark, 35 N. Y., 520

Phelps

v.

Nowlen, 72 N. Y., 39

Penn. Coal Co. v.Sanderson, 113 Penn. St.,
v.

Rawston

Taylor,

126

11 Exch. 378

Driscoll, 20 Conn., Z33

Roath

v.

Razzo

v. Varni

';.81 Cal. 289

Rylands

v.

Fletcher, 1. R. 3 H. L. C., 330

Saddler

v.

Lee, 66 Ga., 45

Taylor

v.

Welch, 6 Or. 200

Taylor

v.

Fickas, 64 Ind.,

Tenant

v.

Goldwin,

167

2 Ld Raymond, 1089

Trustees of Delhi

v.

Youmans, 50 Barb., 316

Trustees of Delhi

v.

Youmans, 45 N. Y., 362

Upjohn
Wheatley

v.

Richland Township,
v.

46 Mich.,

Baugh, 25 Penn. St., 528

542

New Bedford, 108 Mass., 261

Wilson

v.

Walker

v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555

Page 65
Northwestern Law Review, March, 1893,
Harvard Law Review, May, ]294, Page 1.

